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On the Production and Maintenance of
Discursive Power:
Cultural Policy beyond the Nation-state
In June of 2006, a panel of five of Canada’s leading instructors of cultural 
policy was convened as part of the Canadian Communication Association’s 
annual conference to discuss the concept of cultural policy and the challenges 
of teaching it (Savage, 2007).
1
 Two important broad issues were raised in 
these discussions. First, panellists were compelled to question the relevance 
of cultural policy in a postmodern, neoliberal environment in which policy in 
general is perceived to be “inherently in decline” (Savage, p. 121). Second, 
participants voiced concerns about the always ambiguous definition of 
cultural policy and pedagogical difficulties that ensue from this obfuscation. 
My goal here is to contribute to this discussion by addressing the first of the 
above concerns via a rigorous discussion of the second. Cultural policy, I will 
argue, is not in decline, but may simply have changed form. Furthermore, the 
ubiquity of cultural policies has been obscured from our vision exactly 
because we have neglected to produce a theoretically based definition within 
which to locate it. I offer a definition here, and suggest that once such an 
optic is mobilized communication and/or cultural policy reappears as an 
essential, vital, ever-present, contentious, and powerful social phenomenon – 
one that is worthy of increased interest from researchers, instructors, and 
students alike. 
This paper represents an exploratory excursion into the implications of 
explicitly theorizing cultural policy. The intent is more to propose a direction 
in which to begin and to invite discussion and re-evaluation than to cement a 
theory in place. A host of perhaps controversial issues have emerged out of 
this exploration which I hope to address, or that others may address, in the 
future. Since this attempt required a great deal of theoretical ground to be 
covered, there is little room for detailed empirical examples and extensive 
definition of each concept utilized in the argument – although I have tried to 
present as much of this as possible. The discussion will proceed as follows: 
after addressing definitional issues regarding culture and communication, I 
will present an argument for the need for a (re)definition of cultural policy. 
The bulk of the paper will then be dedicated to a synthesis of cultural theory 
and complexity theory toward the end of producing an evaluative framework 
that might move well between disciplines. This framework then assists me in 
generating a new definition of cultural policy. In the final two sections I 
discuss the implications of the theoretical synthesis and resultant 
(re)definition. 
Tim MacNeill
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Culture and Communication
As there is little room here to discuss the vast history of thinking in both 
communication and cultural theory, I will instead present a positive 
explanation of definitions that will be employed. Most fundamentally, I am 
following Carey (1989) in claiming that meanings of communication and 
culture tend to collapse together on close examination. Even within 
transmission views on communication, the idea involves “a process whereby 
messages are transmitted and distributed in space for the control of distance 
and people” (Carey, 1989, p. 15). If we take culture to mean the complex 
“webs of significance” (Geertz, 1973, p. 5) upon which human activity is 
enacted and understood, or simply as a “particular way of life” (Williams, 
2002, p. 41), the transmission view already implies a close relation between 
communication and culture, since the term “control of people” carries with it 
a subtle (albeit slightly frightening) cultural air.  When we add to this, 
Dewey’s assertion that “Men live in a community in virtue of the things 
which they have in common; and communication is the way in which they 
come to possess things in common” (1916, pp. 5–6), the relationship between 
communication and culture becomes tighter. This is evident since, 
“community” here implies a shared order of things and since this order is 
constructed through communication, this group of shared things must include 
the intangible – the ideational. Finally, we may follow Carey in utilizing a 
ritual view of communication which, “sees the original or highest 
manifestation of communication not in the transmission of intelligent 
information but in the construction and maintenance of an ordered, 
meaningful cultural world that can serve as a control and container for human 
action” (1989, p. 19). Communication, in this depiction, becomes collapsed 
into culture as implied by both Geertz and Williams. Communication, then, 
comes to mean “the expression of culture” which, in turn, comes to suggest a 
linguistic ordering of the social world that serves to make it intelligible and 
navigable by human agents. Culture, for the purposes of this paper, will 
correspondingly be used to imply expression through the arts, language, 
sports, or physical movement. It will also, however, be used to refer to the 
both precipitating and resultant ways in which the social universe is ordered 
and made apprehensible to human agents via cultural expression. 
The Need for (re)Definition of Cultural Policy
In most literature, cultural policy has been consistently defined only tacitly 
and empirically – essentially as whatever governments do to intervene in 
markets for cultural goods and services (Throsby, 2001). Critical cultural 
policy scholars have expanded the definition of culture to include all 
“customs and routines of everyday life” and recognized that the market too is 
an institution of cultural regulation (McGuigan, 2004, p. 12), but this has 
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served only to expand the always tacit definition of cultural policy to 
whatever governments or markets do to anything – an unhelpful tautology in 
which what counts as policy is discerned simply by observing the actions of 
governments and markets. Salter provides a helpful definition of policy – as 
“decisions that are made about an issue” (as cited in Savage, 2007, p. 7). 
Here, studying policy becomes much more interesting – an exploration of 
issues and their resolution – but unless culture or communication are defined 
very strictly as the realm of cultural goods and communication industries, we 
are left with an even more hopeless definition of cultural policy: whatever 
anything does to anything. 
In the place of these usually tacit, empirically-based definitions, I will 
construct a theoretically-substantiated definition of cultural policy. In the 
following pages, I will argue that cultural policy would best be conceived as 
an intentional move by an actor or group of actors to produce and/or 
maintain discursive power. This definition, as I will argue, allows us to 
delineate both an inside and an outside to cultural policy. This allows 
theorists to differentiate the type of cultural policy outlined here from what 
might be better termed a “cultural-industrial policy.” The latter implies a 
form of intervention with the intent of addressing market failures in cultural 
industries. This type of policy generally assumes instrumentally rational 
agents who interact through markets to procure cultural goods which satisfy 
their (presumed) stable utilitarian desires. There exist a plethora of evaluative 
techniques in the field of economics with which to address such issues 
(Throsby, 2001; Dayton-Johnson, 2000). Other theorists, however, may 
utilize the cultural policy definition I propose in order to enact interpretive 
methodologies to the end of evaluating instances in which cultural expression 
is performed with the presumption of a changing and malleable field of 
cultural understandings. Such analysis may include evaluations of all the 
forms of power that are mobilized in such cases. An example of such analysis 
may be one which seeks to problematize cultural-industrial policies in 
general as discursive moves by powerful economic and political interests to 
articulate culture toward a general instrumental rationality – one centred on 
economic action in market economies. This is precisely the sort of 
investigation undertaken by Habermas (1984) in his description of the 
colonization of the culturally fluid, creative and deliberative realm of the 
“lifeworld” by the strictly ordered regime of the “systemworld” of market 
and government. 
This exploration will require engagement with a very broad literature. 
Communication theory, cultural studies, critical theory, and political 
economy will all be utilized in this undertaking via a complex theoretical 
bricolage. In order to maintain coherence in lieu of simply creating a 
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theoretical hodgepodge, I will synthesize these borrowings under the rubric 
of complexity theory – an “emergent” theoretical form that has been claimed 
to represent a new “turn” in social theories to rival the Marxian and 
postmodern turns before it (Urry, 2005). Complexity theory, as we will see, is 
generally harmonious with much communication and cultural theory and is 
particularly well suited to depict life in a globalized cultural/informational 
postmodern/late-capitalist economy/society (Appaduarai, 2000; Castells, 
2000; Lyotard, 2000; Jameson, 1984). It is the amelioration of 
agency/structure problems and the extreme transdisciplinary nature of 
complexity theory that makes it a particularly suitable forum in which to 
synthesize diverse schools of thought in a historically contextualized manner 
to the end of illuminating the current nature of cultural policy. My use of 
complexity theory here is also forward-looking. Since the rubric has been 
used increasingly within disciplines as disparate as natural sciences (Gleick, 
1988), sociology (Urry, 2003), and economics (Arthur, 1994), it provides a 
framework in which the issues surrounding cultural policy may be addressed 
across disciplines in the future.
2
A Theory of Complexity and Cultural Policy
If there is a micro-foundation to cultural theory, it lies in communication. The 
work of many theorists has either implicitly or explicitly acknowledged this 
assertion. Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action (1984), the work of 
Giddens (1984), Carey’s “ritual view” of communication (1989), Lacanian 
pyschoanalytics (1977), Lévi-Strauss’s (1963) extension of Saussurian 
linguistics to analyses of human action, indeed the entire “interpretive turn” 
in the social sciences (Taylor, 1971; Geertz, 1973) rest on the postulate that 
whatever else human beings are, at their base they are actors that 
communicate in order to codify, categorize, and create the symbolic world in 
which they live. This “communicative action” (Habermas, 1984), in other 
words, is undertaken in the pursuit of what Giddens has called “ontological 
security” (Smith, 2001, p. 144), with the purpose of negotiating a normative 
and symbolic structure in which human social life is made possible.  
Although it emerged out of the natural sciences, complexity-theory 
correlates noticeably with the above mentioned cultural and communication 
theory. Two key foundational principles that emerged out of the post-linear 
theorization and empirics of the natural world by complexity theorists are (1) 
that interaction creates the attributes of particles and (2) that particles are 
attracted to orderly patterns (Urry, 2005, p. 4). Thus, order tends to emerge 
out of chaos as sub-atomic particles, like human cultural actors, seek their 
own ontological security and come to embody their surroundings (Oldridge, 
2003, p. 303). The results of this tendency in the natural world were for a 
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long time mistakenly perceived by enlightenment scientists as “the natural 
laws of physics” (Urry, 2005; Oldridge, 2003). In the social world, orderly 
cultural patterns were perceived by modern theorists either as “human 
nature” (Taylor, 2001) or “ideological” forms that served to obscure a hidden 
“reality” (Marx & Engels, 1976, pp. 59–62; Gramsci, 1971, pp. 52–58; 
Althusser, 1971), depending on the writer’s political persuasion.  
If human “particles” are structured through interaction with their 
surroundings as they are driven by a need for ontological security, then a 
functionalist social equilibrium might be thought to ensue. Conflict, change, 
agency, and cultural policy for that matter, would all be rendered nonsensical 
by such a postulate. Complexity theorists such as Urry (2005) and Oldridge 
(2003) avoid this structuralist trap with their model of complex adaptive 
systems. Such systems are claimed to be complex by virtue that they contain 
multiple basins of attraction. These basins are nothing more than 
conglomerations of ordered behaviour which exert an attractive force simply 
by providing a locus of order in an otherwise chaotic world. That is, they 
attract because they provide ontological security. Furthermore, complexity 
theorists argue that all systems are open systems that, while they are path 
dependent (historically contingent), are never in equilibrium.  Complex and 
multiscalar interactions between basins of attraction, and the openness of the 
system, ensure that continually emergent forms are only metastable (nearly 
stable) at best and therefore structural change is not only possible, but 
virtually assured (Urry, 2005, p. 8).  
The dynamics of this process are fairly intuitive: the more clearly the 
trajectory of a particle comes to conform with a particular basin of attraction, 
the more the power of that basin is reinforced. This basin then impacts the 
shape of the entire system to a degree that corresponds with its power and 
positioning within the system. The reaction of each particle in the system to a 
change in a basin’s power, in turn, inspires further reactions which, in turn, 
inspire further reactions – producing a state of perpetual change (Urry, 2005; 
Oldridge, 2003). This model has been used by complexity theorists to 
describe various worlds in which agents are determined by structures at the 
same time as possessing power to impact the nature of those very structures – 
whether these worlds are at the quantum or societal level (Gleick, 1988; Urry, 
2005). Since multiple basins of attraction are presumed to exist in complex 
systems, a large – perhaps infinite – number of categories, identities, and 
power structures can be presumed to exist. Some exertions of power may, of 
course, be larger than others, and structures at different times and places may 
be more or less stable (Urry, 2005). 
Much literary and cultural theory is instructive in comprehending the 
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dynamics of complex adaptive systems. According to Smith (1988), the 
“particle” that we are concerned with in human interaction is generally called 
the “individual,” the “subject” or the “agent” (pp. xxxiv–xxxv). For Smith, the 
first two of these terms are misleading. The first is a term that is 
“ideologically designed to give the false impression that human beings are 
free and self-determining” (p. xxxv). The second is usually understood to be 
entirely “the object of determinant forces” (p. xxxiv). Smith uses two 
Althusserian assertions to formulate the “agent” – which is defined as “the 
series or the conglomeration of positions, subject positions … into which a 
person is called momentarily by the discourses and the world that he/she 
inhabits” (p. xxxv).  
The first Althusserian premise is that there is no existence outside of 
ideology – that human consciousness is necessarily constituted of an 
imaginary relation to the “real conditions of existence” (Althusser, 1971, 
p. 153). The second is that subjects are “interpellated” or hailed into existing 
subject positions by ideological discourses generated by ideological state 
apparatuses (ISAs) (Althusser, p. 153). Smith drops the claims that the sources 
of interpellations are necessarily ISAs, and that there exists an objective 
reality, but maintains that agents are interpellated via discourse. He then 
augments Althusser’s theory by asserting that the subject is continually hailed 
by multiple discourses into a plurality of subject positions. Smith completes 
his framework by insisting of agents that:
both they and the discourses they inhabit have histories and 
memories [path dependencies] which alter in constitution 
over time [are metastable] … the interplay of differing 
subject positions [influence of multiple basins of attraction] 
will make some appear pleasurable and others less so; thus a 
tension is produced which compels a person to legislate 
among them [exert agency]. (p. xxxiv)
Human agents, then, have histories. It is these histories that inform agents in 
their interpretation of the basins of attraction with which they have contact. 
Agents, then, are historically compelled to react differently to the same 
forces. We call this phenomenon agency.
Smith’s use of the notion of discourse is important here since, as 
Foucault has reminded us, it is within discourse “that power and knowledge 
are conjoined” (1998, p. 1476). The discourse of particular subjects, then, 
exerts a power over other subjects.  This must not lead us to believe, 
however, that a particular discourse can be a totalizing force, as it can be 
worked creatively upon by those under its sphere of influence, and therefore 
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reproduced, recreated, and re-enacted even as resistance. Discourse can be 
“crystallized” in texts, which are but “instances of discursive production” 
(Hall, 2005, p. 95), and performances, which are themselves but an 
“enunciation of what might be called ‘text acts’” (Mowitt, 1988, p. xxii). 
Since, to be consistent with Hall (1980), all such forms of communication 
must be subjectively interpreted, or “decoded,” that decoding must, once 
expressed, be reincorporated into “frameworks of knowledge” (p. 168). 
Agency, it follows, implies a dialectical and interpretive relationship with 
discourse.  
There is room for a normative claim here. Given the simultaneous 
enactment of performance and interpretation that give force to particular 
basins of attraction, all human social actions and interpretations are also 
“equally engagements or interventions in everyone else’s history and have 
real effects there” (Smith, 1988, p. 158). It follows that differentials in the 
power of agents to impact the form of discursive fields implies inequalities of 
agency. It is precisely the amelioration of such discursive inequalities that 
informs the normative foundation of Habermas’s notion of Öffentlichkeit, or 
public sphere. Calls for deliberative democracy within a public sphere are 
essentially calls for the creation of a forum in which agents can participate 
equally in the construction of lifeworlds (Durham-Peters, 1993; Habermas 
1984; 1989).
We can see, then, that by adding the concept of multiple interpellations 
to the Derridian notion that there is no human thought outside of discourse, 
Smith has aided us in theorizing a space in which we produce our world as it 
produces us. This space correlates strongly with the notion of a complex 
adaptive system, which, I would argue, also correlates with Raymond 
Williams’s (1977) notion of “structures of feeling” in which meanings and 
values as they are actively felt are continually produced within a “structure” 
that is “still in process” (p. 127). This continually changing structure, for 
Williams, exists in interplay between various dominant, residual, and 
emergent forms that all result from historically situated [path dependent] 
mutation based on interpretation and subsequent (inter)action (p. 134). 
Finally, a normative policy metric can be injected here, as social progress 
becomes defined in Habermasian terms as any move to equality of agency in 
impacting discursive forms. Note that this normativity does not imply that 
any particular way of being or state of the world is better than any other, 
provided that it has been negotiated by agents with relatively equal power to 
impact discursive structures. Furthermore, it does not need to imply an 
actually attainable state, rather an ideal toward which policy might be 
directed.
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Despite the correlations, there is a subtle incongruence between 
complexity theory and cultural theory regarding the concept of articulation. 
As used most notably by Lawrence Grossberg and Stuart Hall, both following 
the work of Laclau, the term has come to mean “the form of connection that 
can make a unity of two different elements” (Hall, as cited in Grossberg, 
1986, p. 53). Various discourses need not be congruent with one-another and, 
in fact, may be oppositional. Articulation establishes a felt connection – a 
congruence – between discursive spheres. When all, or nearly all, segments 
of human understanding become connected in such a way with a particular 
discourse, something close to the Gramscian (1971) concept of hegemony is 
established (Grossberg, 1986). Such is the case, according to Gunster (2004), 
when all human meaning-making is articulated by the discourse of the 
commodity form to the point that there is little thought possible outside of it. 
Complexity theory, however, holds that there are always connections between 
components of a complex adaptive system – some of these are simply less-
direct and/or weaker than others (Urry, 2005; Oldridge, 2003). 
Correspondingly, I will retain the use of the term articulation here but attach 
to it the meaning of strengthening or weakening of connections and 
congruencies, as opposed to the creation or destruction of them.  
Agency within structure in complexity theory is assured by the very 
complexity and openness of the system – since something is always 
changing, the particle is always compelled to “choose” amongst emergent 
options based on its historical constitution (Oldridge, 2003). Smith, as I have 
discussed, comes to the same conclusion regarding human social actors, as
it is not that the “subject’s” “me” ever escapes fixity in a 
certain sense, but that the nature of that fixity … is in 
constant change. That is, even if the “subject” establishes 
certain forms of consistency or repetition by way of its 
imaginary identifications … these are continually vulnerable 
to the registration of ever renewed and contradictory 
interpellations. (1988, p. 106)
If agents are thought to have interests in such a context, they must be in 
favouring a discursive form, or basin of attraction, that valorizes, maintains, 
or is at least in congruence with their historically imbedded felt subjectivities 
(Smith, 1988, pp. 157–8). As a discourse is favoured by an agent, however, it 
may relatively diminish the attractive power of another discourse, and that 
discourse might be more congruent with another agent or group that has been 
differently constructed historically. Discourses of feminism, for example, 
may be felt to diminish the relative value of being a historically constituted 
male for those who hold the cultural idea that gender exists in binary. The 
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notion of conflict seeps in here, as culture becomes an arena of contesting 
discourses in which social actors struggle for recognition, authority, and 
voice (Clifford, 1986).  
Complexity theory reminds us that as any discursive field or articulated 
assemblage of fields becomes increasingly powerful due to increased 
participation in it, the entire system will be articulated to varying degrees via 
its influence. Agents, again to varying degrees, internalize the meaning of this 
discourse depending on their special/historical relation to it. This, to 
incorporate a Foucaultian notion, exerts a constituting force upon agents as 
subjectivities are compelled to submit to a particular form of governmentality 
via an assemblage of tactics and institutional configurations that are at their 
root articulated performances of the dominating discourse (Foucault, 1991). 
The extent to which such an articulation can be complete is arguable. 
Horkheimer and Adorno (1972), for example, have presented an argument 
that might be taken as an exposition of the nearly total articulation of the 
commodity form (Gunster, 2004). The centrality of the concepts of polysemy 
and active/creative production of culture within cultural studies, however, 
points to the impossibility of such a conclusion (Hall, 1980; Smith, 2001).  
Agency can, however, exist amidst unequal power relations in 
complexity theory, as it is the layered, multipolar, emergent nature of 
complex systems that is thought to guarantee the incompleteness of a 
particular articulation and the dynamism of the structure (Urry, 2005). It 
follows, however, that those agents who are marginalized by an articulation 
because their historical composition situates them some distance from its 
centre of discursive power, experience a relative diminishment of what might 
be called status or dignity, due to an effective devaluation of what Bourdieu 
(1998) refers to as cultural capital. Their incongruence with a dominant basin 
of attraction leaves them relatively devoid of the cultural traits that signify 
status and belonging.
In the extreme, such agents represent at once the outside fringes of an 
articulation, and a source of the dynamism of the complex adaptive system. If 
their histories designate them as ineffectual participants in the current 
articulation their only recourse may be to attempt to energize a discursive 
field that could assist in mitigating their exclusion. If we are to subscribe to a 
notion that power is both generative and dispersed (Foucault, 1998), this 
scenario is both possible and hopeful. To be consistent with the argument 
presented above, however, such a move would only be imaginable when a 
discursive field, such as one valorizing “human equality,” for example, exists 
in either emergent or residual form and can be re-interpreted to meet the 
historically constituted needs of the affected agents.  
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This, I suggest, is the type of dynamic evoked by Lewis and Miller 
(2003) when they describe a series of “decisions, determinations, and 
struggles that produce one set of outcomes over another” and are enacted in 
the interest of “formatting public collective subjectivity” (p. 2) when 
discussing some forms of cultural policy. Miller and Lewis, along with 
Cunningham (2003), McGuin (2003), and Yúdice and Miller (2002) insist at 
various times that cultural policy can be a process in which forms of 
governmentality are discursively enacted or opposed. As opposed to being 
just one form of cultural policy, I would argue this is the substantive action at 
the core of cultural policy: culture being acted upon using the resource of 
culture itself. Cultural policy, again, must be defined accordingly as an 
intentional move by an actor or group of actors to produce and/or maintain 
discursive power. By “discursive power” I am referring not to a totalizing 
propensity, but rather the degree of articulating power that any given basin of 
attraction may have over others. 
Intent is an important component of this definition since it restricts 
cultural policy becoming simply “anything that anything does.” Given the 
ontological presuppositions of complexity theory, a definition of cultural 
policy that includes the unintentional would necessarily encompass the 
totality of human and non-human activity. This is true since all action 
whether economic, social, or geothermal, for that matter, is thought to have 
some sort of at least minute impact on the entire system in complexity theory 
(Urry, 2005; Oldridge, 2003). That is to say that since in complex adaptive 
systems individuals are often thought to be no more than “‘transitory 
hardenings’ in the more basic flows of massive amounts of minerals, genes, 
diseases, energy, information and language” (Urry, 2005, p. 7), a snowstorm 
or the purchase of a stock share could be considered to be cultural policy if 
such policies may be unintentional.  
What is Cultural Policy? What is Not?
The operationalization of this proposed definition of cultural policy produces 
some interesting conceptual results. Funding for the arts in order to reap 
economic benefits from a creative population is a practice that is often called 
cultural policy (Throsby, 2001; Yúdice & Miller, 2002), but is not so under 
this definition.  The Canadian government, for example, funds music in the 
province of Nova Scotia via decision criteria that privilege potential 
marketability (MNS, 2008; FACTOR, 2008). This funding move does not 
directly seek to produce or maintain a particular field of discursive power – it 
simply aims to reap economic rents utilizing the logics of existing discourses 
without purposefully energizing them. The belief that human creativity must 
be justified by instrumental considerations is assumed to be true, and the 
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funding of diversity for diversity’s sake is excluded by the model. Analysis of 
this model by its own criteria would invite economic considerations and 
economic modeling. These market-driven funding policies may, however, be 
manifestations of past cultural policies. Hermeneutic approaches might, 
therefore, be used by researchers who wish to map-out the ways in which 
emergent neoliberal justifications for market-driven cultural-industrial 
policies have been promoted by certain groups. The strength of the resultant 
basin of attraction that currently articulates this tendency toward market-
based culture may be analyzed and judged according to the extent that the 
discursive power of alternate possible assertions has been overwhelmed. 
Corrective cultural policies may then be undertaken by individuals, groups, 
consortiums of groups, communities, or governments. 
The same is true for the act of utilizing a distinct local culture for the 
purpose of tourism, as in the case with the Maya of Guatemala. The national 
government as well as international business interests mine the image of a 
Maya subject that is presented as “backward” and “quaint” yet “beautiful” to 
procure profits and enhance gross domestic product (Little, 2004). Existing 
characterizations of Maya are mixed here with existing neoliberal ideologies 
that posit culture as a resource for economic development (Yúdice, 2003). 
The success or failure and tendencies toward economic equality or inequality 
within such a system would be interesting work for an economist studying 
cultural-industrial policy. The interesting questions for a cultural policy 
theorist working with the definition I have forwarded would be different. In 
this case, the ways in which the depiction of Maya as primordial has been 
promoted by particular groups, and the ways in which culture has become 
characterized as a commodity might be more interesting for a cultural policy 
theorist. Perhaps more compelling would be the study of the cultural policy 
enacted by various Pan-Maya activists who explicitly seek to re-state the 
meaning of Maya as forward thinking, vibrant, and creative, while staking 
out territory away from the market in which the Maya cosmovision might 
flourish (Fischer & McKenna Brown, 1996).  
In the above examples, I have named particular acts “cultural-industrial 
policies.” Since discourses, and therefore subjectivities (or as economists 
would call them “preference sets” or “tastes”) are presumed stable in these, 
the cultural-industrial policies in these examples would be more accurately 
characterized as economic, rather than cultural, policies. Economics is, after 
all, defined specifically as the social science of human choices that are made 
given the existence of stable “preference sets” (Becker, 1976). This is not to 
say that arguments cannot be entertained as to the extent to which these 
discourses and agents are actually stable, or whether or not such moves have 
unintended cultural consequences, or whether economics has the proper tools 
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to undertake such analyses. What I am claiming here is that cultural policy is 
a special kind of action that requires its own mode of analysis and inquiry 
and should therefore be distinguished from economic analysis. 
These two separate types of action correspond precisely to Habermas’s 
categories of communicative action and strategic action in human social 
relations. Furthermore, they are real, not just analytic distinctions. As 
Habermas suggests:
I do not use the terms “strategic” and “communicative” only 
to designate two analytic aspects under which the same 
action could be described – on the one hand, as a reciprocal 
influencing of one another by opponents acting in a 
purposive-rational manner and, on the other hand, as a 
process of reaching understanding among members of a 
lifeworld. Rather, social relations can be distinguished 
according to whether the participants adopt either a success-
oriented attitude or one oriented toward reaching 
understanding. (1984, p. 286)
One must not be misled by the tone of Habermas’s writing to assume that the 
“process of reaching understanding” to which he refers here is conflict-free. 
Although Habermas insists that there is a possibility in achieving an 
institutional arrangement that facilitates such “rational” negotiation, such an 
institution has not yet been realized. The nature of lifeworlds, for Habermas, 
is up for serious contestation and is imbued with inequitable relations of 
power on multiple levels (Durham-Peters, 1993). Such is the nature of both 
communicative action and cultural policy. Indeed, these two concepts are 
inseparable – to engage in communicative action is to engage in cultural 
policy.
The Changed Nature of Cultural Policy
Since “a public is a social space created by the reflexive circulation of 
discourse” (Warner, 2002, p. 5), various publics and counterpublics are 
inevitably created by the discourses that constitute such practices. The 
spheres in which these publics communicate consequently become important 
sites of cultural production and they often come to delineate the boundaries 
of identity (Durham-Peters, 2003; Anderson, 1983). Within the dominant 
cultural form of modernity, the resultant claims of publics were to be made to 
a governing national state in the name of a rationally discernable truth 
(Habermas, 1989; Taylor, 2001). Cultural policies undertaken via 
subjectivities that were encapsulated by this modern articulation often took 
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the form of national identity-building projects (Dayton-Johnson, 2000), 
advertising to foster “self-interested” consumerism (Bauman, 1998; Herman 
& Chomsky, 1988), and oppositional movements that sought to expose the 
“real” nature of alienation in a capitalist system (Marx & Engels, 1976; 
Marx, 2002; Horkheimer & Adorno, 1972).
The designation of the historical era that has been called postmodernity 
(Lyotard, 2000) or late-capitalism (Jameson, 1984) marks a modification to 
such subjectivities and the multiple publics they evoke. This turn was typified 
by a decline of the nation-state along with intensification of commodification 
– specifically of informational and cultural resources (Castells, 2000; 
Baudrillard, 1994; Drucker 1993; Jameson, 1984). Concepts of “the real” and 
“human nature” were marginalized as discursive categories with the rise of 
the postmodern (Taylor, 1971; Lyotard, 2000). Consequently, the idea that 
“what is does not necessarily have to be” became a powerful interpellating 
discourse for human actors (Hall, 2004, p. 130). Culture, as a result, has 
increasingly become “the legitimizing ground” on which particular groups 
make claims for “resources and inclusion” (Yúdice & Miller, 2002, p. 15). 
Identity, (which has always been the locus of historically situated, constantly 
transformative, discursively productive, cultural-political practices), has 
become more expedient in this regard (Yúdice, 2003). The ascendance of the 
very idea of culture as a discursive category amidst postmodern political 
economy, then, may have increased the relevance and incidence of cultural 
policy just as the power of nation state seemed to be declining due to 
neoliberal reforms.
Cultural policies, in short, may have acquired more legitimacy and 
instrumental force with the decline of the nation-state and the associated 
trappings of modernity, not less. Where once, the nation-state was the 
articulating concept in which culture was to reside, transnational flows of 
material and immaterial culture, which are often commodified and 
transmitted by increasingly powerful media institutions (Appadurai,
 2000), have congealed in multiple sites and across scales and borders. The 
resultant discourses have become temporarily hardened within, and 
performed by, complex subjectivities. It is in these sites and via these 
subjectivities that power/knowledge is produced, re-formed, and resisted
in multifarious ways with the explicit intent of augmenting discursive 
structures and therefore the complex adaptive system in which life is 
animated and imagined. Analysts who look at policy atheoretically through 
an optic of the nation-state will miss all of this, and see only the declining of 
cultural policy.
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Conclusion
I have presented a thorough reformulation of the concept of cultural policy 
via the fusion of communication, cultural, and complexity theory. The 
general argument was that cultural policy should not be defined empirically 
as whatever governments do to culture, rather it should be defined 
theoretically, as an intentional move by an actor or group of actors to 
produce and/or maintain discursive power. Once this is done, theorists can 
end their lamentation of the perceived ineffectuality of cultural policy as it 
becomes evident that cultural policy has not disappeared, rather it has been 
popularised. That is to say that, although it may seem to have been wrested 
away from nation states to a certain extent, such cultural policy is 
increasingly enacted in diverse and creative ways by numerous state and non-
state actors. Furthermore, the study of such actions as enactments of cultural 
policies could provide an exciting and rewarding direction for future 
research.  
As communication infrastructures and multinational capitalism span 
increasingly across the globe, advertisers still work to create consumers while 
states instigate policies to constitute their nations to be sure. So too do anti-
globalization, environmental, and various indigenous movements work to 
articulate an expansive, global and cultural complex adaptive system to their 
benefit through the production of discursive power – often utilizing vast 
communication networks as means, and discourses of “democracy” and 
“freedom” as guiding principles (Hardt & Negri, 2004, pp. 81–91). These are 
concrete enactments of cultural policy beyond the nation-state. Their 
analysis, description, and critique could be a central focus of communication 
and cultural theorists – especially those concerned with forming, supporting, 
articulating and imagining alternative future discursive shapes for the 
complex adaptive system that we inhabit. 
Notes
1. The panel was actually framed as a discussion of “communication 
policy.” In the tradition of Carey (1989), I consider the terms 
“communication” and “culture” as functionally interchangeable, since 
they are mutually constitutive, as I will explain later. I therefore take this 
panel to have been addressing cultural policy and communication policy 
simultaneously.
2. This search for a common framework is exceptionally important for me 
since my work in culture and international development necessitates 
cross-disciplinary dialogue between practitioners and academics from a 
variety of disciplines. Much vital work must be done, for example, 
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regarding the interconnectivity of environmental, cultural, economic, 
and political issues in the study of international development. I expect 
that many others can relate to this need for a common dialogic optic in 
addressing other complex issues.
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